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Abstract:  In this paper, we document the importance of individual variations in wage
outcomes of displacement, as opposed to the change in the wage distribution itself.  Most
of the research on displaced workers has focused on analyzing changes in the wage
distribution. We show that, while the changes in the distribution of wages before and after
displacement are real, as shown in many previous studies, they are negligible compared to
the enormous game of musical chair taking place between workers within these
distributions.  When studying displaced workers, we show that, from an individual
worker’s point of view, the change in the distribution of wages matters much less than the
draw they will make within these distributions.  We show that workers suffer large
movements within the distribution of wages before and after displacement.  Finally, we
show that even with reasonable levels of risk aversion, these large movements inside the
wage distribution translate into important losses of utility for the workers.
Both authors thank Canada’s SSHRC and Quebec’s FCAR for generous financial
support.1
 1. Introduction
The fate of permanently displaced workers has captured a lot of attention among
economists, policy-makers and the media over the last decade.  This attention, marked
both in academia and in policy, has certainly been generated by the impression of
pervasiveness of permanent worker displacement in the new economy, and by the
perception of the magnitude of the costs (public and private) that such displacements
create.   During the periods of job loss and downsizing of the early 1990s,  Robert Reich’s
term the “anxiety class” was used to describe a group of Americans who live in constant
fear of experiencing a slide in their standards of living.   The purpose of this paper is to
use economic methods to measure the size of the anxiety induced by uncertainty caused
by potential job displacement.
It is now well established that permanently displaced workers in North America
suffer large and long lasting wage losses.  This has been established by research going
back as early as Podgursky and Swain (1987), Addison and Portugal (1990), Ruhm
(1991) and many others.  The only issue remaining to date with that respect is the exact
magnitude of these losses.  Recent research by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993)
indicates that the magnitude of wage losses of displaced workers has been vastly
underestimated because in many cases the wages of the displaced workers had started to
fall long before they were displaced.  While the private costs of permanent displacement
are real, and at the risk of sounding particularly insensitive to the plight of a category of
workers hard hit by the economic conditions, it is hard to understand why the fate of
displaced workers has captured so much of the collective imagination.  After all,
displacements have always been a part of the economic life, and, at least in the US, most
displaced end up finding a new job
1 and, while they suffer substantial wage losses, these
losses are far from dreadful.
2
                                                          
1  70% of the displaced workers surveyed in the Bureau of the Census’s Displaced
Workers Surveys between 1984 and 1992 have found a new job by the time of the survey.2
From time to time,  the media has also been perplexed by the central role of
displacement in recent political debate.  Writing in The Washington Post in 1995,  Jodie
Allen cited studies showing that “…the average worker is in no greater peril of losing a
job than was true 20 or 30 years ago.”   Allen also questioned validity of “worker
adjustment” proposals but notes that the Clinton administration planned to increase this
spending above the prevailing level of $2.5 billion per year.
In this paper, we argue that the high level of interest generated by the fate of
displaced workers among politicians from Pat Buchanan to Bill Clinton is due to anxiety
linked more to the considerable uncertainty associated with displacement than by its
incidence or average measured effects.  People are risk averse and this implies that
displacement is one of these economic phenomena where the variance matters more than
the mean.  Most previous academic studies have sought  the best measure of the mean
effect has lead researchers to disregard too much the high variance surrounding these
mean effect and have largely ignored  the disutility associated with displacement induced
wage-risk.  Indeed, while the mean effect of displacement on wages is non negligible, it is
dwarfed by the large variance surrounding it, and we believe that this high variance is
precisely the source of the fear of displacement which is workers and then responded to
by politicians.
This large variances in post-displacement earning outcomes - and the fact that
some displaced workers actually end up earning more after displacement then before has
already been pointed out, but, to our knowledge, not extensively researched.  For
example, Kletzer (1991) showed that 36.7% of blue collar men and 25.8% of white-collar
men lost more than 25 % of their pre-displacement salary.  On the other hand,  32.3 % of
displaced blue collar workers and 45% of their white collar counterparts actually
                                                                                                                                                                            
This proportion increases to 85% when considering only these workers who remained in
the labor force.3
experienced wage increases.   The empirical analysis of Kletzer’s paper focus upon
regressions for post-displacement earnings, however.  The central concern of this paper
will be the nature and implications of the variance of wage changes rather than their
average size.
In this paper, we first document the importance of individual variations in wage
outcomes of displacement.  Then we show that changes in the mean of pre and post-
displacement distribution are negligible compared to the enormous game of musical chair
taking place within these distributions.  When studying displaced workers, we will show
that, from an individual worker`s point of view, the change in the distribution of wages
matters much less than the draw they will make inside these distributions.  We will show
that workers suffer large movements within the distribution of wages before and after
displacement, movements which are so large that they almost render meaningless any
other aspect of displacement.
Section 1 will briefly present the data used in this study;  in Section 2 we will
present the magnitude of individual movements within pre and post displacement wage
distributions;  Section 3 will try to investigate the causes of these movements.  In section
4, we will provide an estimation of the cost associated with that uncertainty; and finally,
we will present some concluding remarks.
1. Data
We use a merged data-set constructed by combining the 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, and
1992 U.S. Surveys of Displaced Workers.  Each SDW is a supplement to the January
CPS of the given year.   A series of supplemental questions are asked of all workers who
had permanently lost a job at some point during the five years preceding the survey date.
The SDW collects detailed information about workers’ pre and post displacement labor
                                                                                                                                                                            
2  Between the time they lost their job and Survey time, the average real wage loss
for reemployed workers in the 1984 to 1992 SDW’s is slightly higher than 9%.4
market experiences.  These data have been widely used in the past and so there is little
need to delve into details about their properties (see, for example, Podgursky and Swain
(1987), or Addison and Portugal (1990)). It is however worth noting that most of the
critiques generally addressed to the survey, and in particular issues related to the
measurement of unemployment duration and UI-receipt recall biases, do not apply to the
wage data which we will be using.
Merged SDW data have been used in the past by Kletzer (1991),  for example,
who used the 1984 and 1986 survey samples.   To simplify comparability between years,
all wage data have been deflated, and real wages in 1984 dollars will be used in this
study.  This is also standard practice.   Kletzer, for example, adjusted wages to 1982
dollars using the GNP deflator.
Finally, we have chosen to limit the sample in order to minimize the possible
impact of recall errors upon wage changes.  We confine the sample to workers who were
aged between 20 and 65 at the time of displacement and were displaced from non-
agricultural activities. We also limited our sample to reemployed workers for whom
neither the information on the lost wage nor that on the new wage were missing.
3  Finally,
we have only included full-time to full-time transitions and have excluded any suspicious
wage values (i.e. observations where the log of either the lost or the new weekly wage
was below 4).  All these restrictions were taken to ensure that the most flagrant cases of
measurement error would be excluded.
                                                          
3  Since the purpose of our exercise is not to find a consistent estimate of the
average magnitude of the wage loss, but rather to look at individual wage changes
conditional upon reemployment, this is the right sample to use, and are less worried about
sample selection bias.5
2.  Wage Losses of Displaced Workers.
Table 1 presents the basic statistics of the pre and post displacement distributions of
wages.  It shows that both distributions look rather similar, although the mean wage and
degree of skewness fall in the post-displacement.  The statistics for changes in weekly
wages are particularly interesting.  While the mean wage loss of a displaced worker is
approximately 9.5%, the standard deviation of these changes is about .445.  If wage
changes were normally distributed - an assumption clearly rejected by the other moments
of the distribution - the magnitude of the standard deviation would make the mean loss
statistically  non-significantly different from zero.  While on average, displaced workers
lose some wages, some lose a lot, some lose less, but some actually gain.  These findings
reflect those documented by Kletzer (1991) using just two sets of SDW data.
Still more interesting information is provided by the rank-order and transition
statistics presented in the lower panel of Table One.  The rank order correlation between
old and new wage is only .637 meaning that the positions of workers within the wage
distribution vary a lot between their old and new job.  Moreover, not only do workers
move often in the distribution, we also find that they frequently move far away from their
previous position.  The bottom panel of Table One presents a transition matrix between
the quartiles of the old and new wage distributions.  Less than 50% (49.7%) of the
workers remain in the same quartile of the wage distribution before and after
displacement.  Of those who move to another quartile,  37.3% of them move up or down
by one quartile,  10.6% experience a shift of two quartiles and finally 2.4% actually move
from one extreme of the distribution to the other.  Persistence is much higher at the
extremes (and specially the upper end) of the distribution.  Respectively, 56.9% and
62.6% of those in the lower and upper quartile and of the lost wage distribution remain in
the same quartile after displacement.6
This results show that the changes observed for average wages before and after
displacement are far less dramatic than the possible reshuffling within the distribution
that I sfaced by a displaced worker.  It is important to recall that a risk averse worker will
derive less utility from the possibility of being shuffled upward than the utility loss
associated with a possible downward shuffling of the same magnitude.  Of course,  this
shuffling does not represent risk to the extent that the direction of the movement within
the wage distribution is predictable.  The following section determines how much of the
shuffling can be attributed to observable characteristics of workers and how much
residual wage variation can rightly be viewed as due to anxiety-inducing risk.
3.  The Causes of Individual Wage Changes
Several phenomena can explain the large movement in the positions of individual
between the pre and post-displacement wage distributions.  Amongst these possible
explanations are: measurement error in one or both of the two wages, changes in the
return to some human capital characteristics before and after displacement, the possible
loss of rents associated with a union-status job, and true idiosyncratic wage changes.
If there is measurement error in either the lost or new wages, these errors should
not translate in the subsequent or prior wage, resulting in large measured individual wage
changes which do not correspond to any actual change.  Pre and post displacement
changes can also vary because of observables.  Much of the existing displaced workers
literature has sought to quantify these effects.  Some workers lose more than other
because they lose some rents - union workers, for example; because their skills are less in
demand - older, less educated workers, for example; or because their characteristics
change between the old and the new job - high tenured workers, workers switching
industry or occupation, for example.
Finally, wages can change because of pure idiosyncratic effects.  Some of these
effects can persist between jobs - true unobserved differences in a worker’s productivity,
for example, but some won’t.  In that case, these effects -although true - often cannot be7
distinguished from measurement error. For example, in the case of workers who were
lucky when they found their lost job might not be that lucky this time, and vice-versa, it is
hard without additional information to distinguish such an effect from pure measurement
error.  We will try to assess the importance of each of these three phenomena in
explaining the large individual wage changes of displaced workers.
3.1 Measurement Error.
The simplest explanation for large observed wage shuffling is measurement error.  Any
error in the measure of either the pre or post displacement wage will lead to meaningless
measures of wage changes.  While it is, by definition, difficult to exactly assess the
importance of measurement error in our data, we propose here a simple test to try to
figure out some order of magnitude for this problem.
We divided the sample in two: those workers who lost their job at least three years
before the survey, and those who lost it at most two years before.  The idea behind that
partition is that memory biases should be much less important for these workers who lost
their job more recently, while these who lost it 5 years ago are more likely to have
problems remembering correctly their wage at that time.  Table Two parallels the lower
part of Table One and presents the results of the rank order correlation and of the
transition matrix between the quartiles of the old and new wage distributions separately
for the two groups.
The table shows that movements inside the wage distributions are more
pronounced for these workers who lost their job a long time ago.  The Spearman rank-
order correlation test increase to .675 for recently displaced workers, while it falls to .603
for the ones laid off a long time ago.   Similarly, the proportion of workers remaining in
the same quartile of the wage distribution increase to 52.5% and falls to 46.8%
respectively for the same two groups.8
While not dramatic, these figures indicate that there must be some problem of
measurement error taking place.  If measurement errors were completely absent, the
correlation between old and new wages should be higher for the sub-sample of persons
displaced earlier.  This is because time will erase some initial wage losses which could
have been due to the imperatives of liquidity constraints which forced an unemployed to
take any job at first with the intention of searching for something better over time.  Also,
as Jacobson et al (1995) show, time is an important factor in allowing wages to ‘get back
to normal’ for displaced workers.  For all these reasons, everything else being equal, we
would expect to see higher correlations for these who were displaced long ago.  The
results presented here give the opposite result and we conclude that this is evidence of
greater error in the measurement of pre-displacement wages for episode of displacement
occurring some time before the survey date.
On the other hand, we consider the measure proposed above to be an upper bound
on the magnitude of measurement error.  There could actually be economic explanations
for these differences in behavior between the recent and distant displacement groups
groups.  This would imply that some of the differences would not be due to measurement
error.  Also,  the nature of the SDW limits the likely size of other form of measurement
error beside the recall bias detected by our test.  Even if surveyed workers misunderstand
some aspects of the questions related to wages, it is not very likely that they would apply
different interpretations to two questions worded in very comparable way which are asked
just a few minutes apart in the survey.
3.2:  Changes in Returns to Human Capital Attributes
Despite the fact that measurement error appears to play some role in explaining this large
game of musical chair displaced workers are subjected to, it is doubtful it can explain all
the individual variations in wages.  Some of these changes can correspond to individual9
changes in their human capital attributes (workers acquiring more education, losing their
specific human capital); in other relevant attributes (workers moving or changing industry
or occupation); or again in the returns to some of these attributes (to the extend that
returns to age correspond to some rents, they might fall between the old and new job).
To evaluate the magnitude of these effects on the individual movements in the
wage distribution, we performed two regressions on the pre and post displacement wages.
The  regressions are typical, human capital theory inspired, Mincerian wage equation.  In
that framework, the wage obtained by a worker is a function of her personal
characteristics, her experience on the labor market (her 'general' human capital, here
represented by the variable ‘Age’) and her experience on the job and on previous jobs
(her 'specific' human capital, represented by the variable ‘Tenure’).  Formally, we have:
ln( ) ,, , , , , W Age Tenure X u ij j ij jk ik
k
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where index j represents the different jobs held and the index i represents the workers.
The log of the wage of individual i in job j is a function of her total labor market
experience at that time, her tenure on that job and on previous jobs, and a set of
individual characteristics, represented here by the matrix X.  We allow the specific
experience accumulated in previous jobs to be of some value in future jobs.  The
coefficients can be different between jobs, explaining the j indexing them.  This allows
worker characteristics to be of different value across jobs.
The results of these typical human capital wage equations are presented in Table
Three.  The comparison of the coefficients between the first and second columns of the
table allows to determine which categories of workers tend to lose more from
displacement.  These results are well known, since, as we already noted,  they have been
the focus of most of the displaced workers literature so far.  Our results echo these10
findings:  older,  high tenured, less educated, male workers tend to be the ones losing the
most.
It is worth noting that we do not have data on union status despite the fact that
movements between unionized and non-unionized jobs may explain wage shuffling.
Kuhn and Sweetman (1998) use Canadian job displacement data in which unionization
data are available and conclude that “… about 75% of the total wage loss was borne by
workers who lost union coverage as a result of displacement.”  The authors estimate that
a comparable figure for the United States, with its lower union coverage rate, would be
“…between 39% and 54%.”.   Thus, we may miss an important predictor of post-
displacement job loss.    This point needs to be considered as a possible limit on the
extent of the risk facing displaced workers when they are able to condition on their
current unionization status.  Again, though,  unionization rates are sufficiently low in the
United States that this issue does not apply to the vast majority of persons in our sample.
On the basis of our regression estimates in Table Three,  we generate fitted values
for pre and post displacement wages for all the workers in the.  By doing so, we obtain
measures of wages free of measurement errors and of any idiosyncratic effect.  In Table 4,
we again replicate the measures of shuffling from Table One, this time using our fitted
wage series rather than the actual wages as was the case in Table One.
Table Four shows that our observables explain a little more than half the
individual movements inside the wage distribution.  The Spearman rank order correlation
is now .83, almost halfway between 1 and the correlation of .64 estimated for wages (as
opposed to fitted wages).  The proportion of workers remaining in the same quartile of
the distribution increases now to 60%.  Of workers who change quartiles, 40% of the
displaced workers will move up or down at least one quartile in the wage distribution. It
is important to remember that this degree of shuffling is predicted on the basis of their
observable characteristics.  Of the 13,744 transitions in the table,  only 47 workers11
manage to accumulate so many positive or negative characteristics that these could bring
them at the other extreme of the wage distribution.
While observables explain only half of the movements, this is certainly an
important half.  But a correlation of .83 is far from one.  At individual level, a large share
of the movements within distribution cannot be explained or predicted on the basis of
observables.  Therefore, even if an individual is perfectly informed of the impact of her
observable characteristics on the outcome of displacement, a lot of uncertainty regarding
her future will remain.
Some observers have suggested that, from a social point of view, wage losses due
to the loss of rents even are bad for individuals but the rents may simply be redistributed
among individuals.   Once again, though,  risk aversion implies that the possibility of
gains yields less utility than equal losses and so even pure rent shuffling may yield
considerable risk-related anxiety that does not disappear at the aggregate level.
The last part of Table Four confirms that the differences between workers
displaced a some time ago versus. the more recently displaced noticed in Table 2 has to
be attributed to measurement error.  In this table, no appreciable difference in the patterns
of movements within the wage distribution can be noticed between the early an later
displacement groups when fitted wages are used.  Since there are no reasons to believe
that idiosyncratic effects could be different over time, the differences noted in Table Two
indicate the presence of some measurement error.
3.3 Idiosyncratic Effects
There are two types of idiosyncratic effects, which have very different impact on the
problem studied here.12
First, there are individual effects that can affect a person’s position inside the
wage distribution but which are not linked to either observables or to measurement error.
Among these effects, there could be lost rents (not identifiable by observables, as in the
case of unionized workers, for example); signaling problems (linked to the type of signal
that displaced workers can send to potential employers, like those described by Gibbons
and Katz (1991), for example); unobserved heterogeneity in reservation wages due to
wealth;  etc.…As we noted in the introduction of this section, all these problems can
hardly be distinguished from measurement error, unless sophisticated tests, like the one
used by Gibbons and Katz, are designed for each of them, and they all should lead to
large movements inside the wage distribution.
Second are transferable unobserved characteristics of the workers.  If some of an
individual’s residual in her lost job corresponds to some of her unobserved quality, this
component should persist into their new job.  When correctly taken into account, this
effect should lead to a persistence in a worker’s position in the wage distribution which is
higher than the one estimated on the basis of observable only.
The fact that the rank order correlation between the residuals of the two
regressions presented in Table 3 is .5064 indicates some persistence of unobserved
characteristics across jobs.  If residuals were purely random, it should be zero.  In table 5,
we adjust our estimation to take that correlation into account using seemingly unrelated
regression methods.  The estimation does not, however, change in any substantial the
impact of displacement on individual movements inside the wage distribution.  The rank
order correlation of the fitted wages using the SURE technique increases only to .853.
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4  We also tried to use a two stage method were we would regress the same variables
on the difference between wages and the mean individual residual estimated from Table
3.  In that case too, the rank order correlation increases only marginally to .851.13
We conclude from that evidence that some movements within the wage
distributions cannot be predicted from the worker’s position in the pre-displacement wage
distributions conditional upon its observables.  In other words, while workers carry a
share of the error term in their pre-displacement wages into their new jobs, this share
carried into the new job cannot explain much of the movements within the wage
distribution.  These very movements inside the wage distribution which cannot be
explained by observables (including the wage residual from the old job) or by
measurement error is the main source of uncertainty for displaced workers.
4. The Cost of Uncertainty in terms of Utility
In this section, we try to quantify the implicit cost associated with uncertainty.  So far, we
have shown that measurement error appeared to explain only a minor fraction of the
movements within wage distributions while observables could explain a little more than
half of it.  To estimate the cost of uncertainty, we have to first define the nature of
uncertainty for workers.  To some extent, any movement related to observables should
not be uncertain.  Yet it is clear that workers are not completely aware of all the
consequences linked to all of their observable characteristics.  This is why we will
perform our measures of the cost of uncertainty by limiting our samples to groups of
generally comparable workers.
This paper has argued that a key feature of job displacement is the unpredictable
nature and the large variance in outcomes of wage losses after displacement.  If risk-
averse workers are willing to pay a premium for certainty, the cost of displacement is
under-estimated by an average wage change.  Averages are only accurate measures of the
disutility of displacement when individuals are risk-neutral.  In this section, we seek to
determine the extent to which concavity of the utility function lowers utility when faced
with an uncertain new job.14
This task is accomplished primarily by calculating a certainty equivalent new
wage that, if provided with certainty, would yield the same utility as a lottery over the
distribution of possible new wages.   More precisely, w
c, the certainty equivalent wage
corresponding to the lottery over post-displacement wages  ~ w,  is defined by the equation:
E[ (~)] ( ) Uw Uw
c =
The size of the certainty equivalent wage depends upon the degree of curvature of the
utility function and the variance of the wage lottery.   The greater the degree of risk
aversion,  the lower the certainty equivalent wage.
This wage can then be compared with the old wage to compare the utility
associated with the following three situations: (i) having the old job and (ii) facing
uncertainty regarding the new job and (iii) being guaranteed that the post-displacement
wage will equal the certainty-equivalent wage.
To quantify the cost of uncertainty,  it is necessary to determine the degree of
curvature of the utility function.  One measure of aversion to risk that is frequently used is
the coefficient of relative risk aversion.   If utility over certain events z is given by the










For this paper, two values of this coefficient are used.  First,  a logarithmic utility function
U(z) = log(z) is used to give a coefficient of relative risk aversion of one while a
coefficient of relative risk aversion of 5 is obtained with the utility function:





This is gives the two end points of the range of values used in Rouwenhorst (1995)
5. We
will thus look at the top and bottom values of  generally accepted values of aversion to
risk.
To attempt to measure risk, we need to make certain assumptions.  First, we will
take examine a reasonably homogeneous group of workers and assume that all workers in
that group face as individuals the observed distribution of new wage outcomes for the
group as a whole.   This is incorrect to the extent that individuals are well informed about
their relative position in the group but the evidence on wage shuffling presented thus far
suggests that they are not well informed.  Also, we will assume that utility is defined over
weekly income rather than consumption.  Given that we do not have separate
consumption data this is the best we can do.  In any case,  this assumption is not unusual
in textbooks in financial economics where utility is defined on lotteries for income or
wealth rather than consumption, at least initially.
To obtain homogeneous groups the following sample restrictions were imposed.
First, only men between 30 and 55 years of age were retained in the sample used in
previous sections.  Results were calculated for this group and also for two sub-groups, the
first with real wages in the pre-displacement job between $350 and $450 and then for the
range from $375 to $475.  In the table below, we present the average pre and post-
displacement wages as well as the dollar value with certainty wages that yield the same
utility as the expected utility of the lotteries faced by risk-averse workers.
                                                          
5 Rouwenhorst  bases this range on a recommendation from Hall (1988).  It is worth
noting that Rouwenhorst refers to coefficients of relative risk aversion values of up to 28
found in some studies.  Such a value would dramatically increase the disutility of
displacement.16
Table 6:  Loss of Utility Associated with Uncertainty in Wages Losses





Old Job New Job Log Utility F = 5
No wage restriction $446.2 $391.6 $346.0 $104.7
$350   old wage   $450 $396.9 $368.8 $345.5 $247.0
$375   old wage   $425 $401.4 $373.5 $346.2 $245.0
The story told by this table is the following.   First, for each of these groups it is
true that expected  wage changes are small, ranging from 12% to 7%.  Again, these are
expected wage changes assuming that each person in the group could be at any point in
the old or new wage distribution and are not actual wage changes.  What is striking
though is how much lower the certainty equivalent new wages are relative to the expected
new wages.    This lets us know how much a worker facing the lottery would pay to get
the average new wage with certainty.  For instance, even with the most restricted sample a
worker with the higher coefficient of relative risk aversion (F = 5) would pay up to $(373
- 245) = $128 to avoid the lottery.  In other words, the utility associated with the
uncertainty of displacement is equivalent to that of a certain wage loss of enormous
proportions.  While the size of this certain wage cut is not as dramatic with logarithmic
utility, it is still almost twice the expected change ($55 versus $28).
5. Conclusions
While the displaced workers literature has focused essentially so far on changes in the
wage distributions before and after displacement, this is not what matters the most to an17
individual displaced worker.  In reality, her welfare will be less affected by the changes in
the distributions than by the position she will occupy within it.  As we have showed, a
very large game of musical chair is taking place amongst workers after a displacement.
Observables can explain only approximately 40% of the individual movements inside the
wage distribution. The displaced worker literature has focused almost exclusively so far
on that part of the displacement experience.  From an individual point of view, this tells
less than half the story.  The remaining half of individual movements inside the wage
distribution (the sixty percent of movements which are not explained by observables) can
be attributed to measurement error, but mostly to true idiosyncratic effects, and this part
of the displacement experience has not been studied so far.
We have also presented evidence pointing towards the presence of a problem of
measurement error.  However, this problem appears to be relatively limited.  If we believe
that measurement error is likely minor for those workers recently displaced, measurement
error could explain roughly 20% of the movements.
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This would leave close to 40% of the movements to be purely idiosyncratic.
Workers move inside the distribution of wages but because of many other reasons,
including bad luck, loss of rents, imperfect signaling of their true human capital and so
on.  This is the source of the great individual uncertainty surrounding displacement.
We have also shown that this shuffling of workers has large consequences for the
welfare of workers facing displacement.  Comparisons of expected wage changes alone
are found to significantly understate the disutility associated with job displacement.  If
this finding is compounded with Jacobson et al’s findings -showing that individual
                                                          
6  This figure was computed using the formula (.675-.603)/(1-.637), where the
numerator is the difference in rank correlation between those observations more likely to18
earnings had started to decline before displacement - and with the cost of uncertainty
associated with the duration of unemployment - which we do not consider here, it is
obvious that both private and social costs associated with displacement are much higher
than the simple measure of the difference between pre- and post- displacement wage
would indicate.  This helps to explain why job displacement is an important policy and
research issue.
Finally, more research is certainly necessary to better understand that curious (but
rather large) group of workers who actually gain from displacement.  The fact that some
displaced workers actually end up earning more after displacement than they used to is
puzzling.  It can only mean one of three things.  Either there are very large fixed costs
associated with switching jobs - unless they are forced to, workers don’t switch to avoid
these fixed costs.  If this is the case, this would constitute another source of cost for
                                                                                                                                                                            
be affected by measurement error and the others, and the denominator is a measure of the
magnitude of movements inside the distribution.19
displaced workers which is not accounted by wages.  Or, workers are unaware of these
possibilities until they are actually displaced and forced to search.  This would raise many
questions worth investigating regarding information on the labor market.  Finally, some
workers might obtain higher wages, but worse overall compensation packages because of
other unobserved compensating differentials.  If this last hypothesis were to be true, it
would question the complete approach followed in the displaced workers literature, were
the estimation of costs of displacement is based upon wages.20
Bibliography :
Addison J.T. and Portugal P., "Job Displacement, Relative Wage Changes and Duration
of Unemployment" Journal of Labor Economics ,Vol. 7, No. 31, pp. 281-302,
1989.
Allen, J.,  “Why Retooling Workers Is No Quick Fix For Anxious America”,  The
Washington Post, January 22,  1995.
Gibbons, Robert and Katz, Lawrence F., “Layoffs and Lemons,” Journal of Labor
Economics, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 351-80, 1991.
Hall, Robert,  "Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption",  Journal  of Political
Economy,  Vol. 96, pp.339-57, 1988.
Jacobson, L.S., Robert J. LaLonde and Daniel G. Sullivan, “Earning Losses of Displaced
Workers.”  American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 685-709, 1993.
Kletzer, L.,  “Earnings After Displacement:  Job Tenure, Industry, and Occupation,” in;
Job Displacement:  Consequences and Implications for Policy, John T. Addison,
ed., Detroit:  Wayne State University Press, 1991.
Kuhn, P. and A. Sweetman,  “Wage Loss Following Displacement:  Th eRole of Union
Coverage”,  Industrial and Labor Relations Review,  Vol. 51 No. 3,  pp. 384-
400,  1998.
Podgursky M., Swaim, P., "Job Displacement and Earning Loss: Evidence from the
Displaced Worker." Industrial and Labour Relations Review.  Vol. 41, No. 1,
pp. 17-29, 1988.
Rhum, C.J., “Are Workers Permanently Scarred by Job Displacements?”  American
Economic Review, Vol. 81, N0.1, pp. 319-23, 1991.
Rouwenhorst K.G., "Asset pricing Implications of Equilibrium Business  Cycle Models"
in Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Thomas Cooley ed., Princeton
University Press, 1995.21
Table 1:  Pre and Post Displacement Wage Distributions
Basic Statistics:
Log(Lost Wage) Log (New Wage) D Log Wage
Mean 5.768 5.674 -.095
Standard Deviation .529 .517 .445
Skewness .200 .120 -.358
Kurtosis 2.984 2.744 5.163
Spearman Rank Order Correlation between Log(Lost Wage) and Log(New Wage):
.637






25 - 50 50 - 75 Highest
$ Values of weekly
wage <202 202-289 289-415 >415
Lowest <219 2,000 1,012 397 109
25 - 50 219-313 850 1,388 975 305
50 - 75 313-460 444 768 1,403 902
Highest >460 224 350 742 2,20222
Table 2:  Assessment of the Magnitude of the Measurement Error Problem
Workers Who Lost their Jobs Two Years or Less Ago:






25 - 50 50 - 75 Highest
Lowest   916   449 142  40
25 - 50 361   638 431 116
50 - 75 188 318   672 368
Highest  82 141 301 1,023
Spearman Rank Order Correlation between Log(Lost Wage) and Log(New Wage):
.6750
Workers Who Lost their Jobs Three Years or More Ago:






25 - 50 50 - 75 Highest
Lowest 1,050   548 271 72
25 - 50 486   717 547 190
50 - 75 272 447   704 517
Highest 133 228 418 1,162
Spearman Rank Order Correlation between Log(Lost Wage) and Log(New Wage):
.603123
Table 3:  Pre and Post Displacement Wage Regressions
Dependent Variable:  Log(Real Weekly Wage)
Lost Wage New Wage
Married .047 (.008) .072 (.008)
African American -.130 (.014) -.118 (.014)
Man .293 (.008) .239 (.008)
Head of Household .020 (.008) .013 (.008)
Age .044 (.003) .037 (.003)
Age Squared -.0004 (.0000) -.0004 (.0000)
Tenure Job Lost .030 (.002) .011 (.002)
Tenure Job Lost Squared -.001 (.000) -.0004 (.0000)
Tenure New Job .033 (.011)
Tenure New Job Squared -.0003 (.0001)
Education:
Elementary -.780 (.039) -.729 (.039)
Junior High -.519 (.022) -.593 (.022)
Some High School -.449 (.016) -.521 (.016)
High School Diploma -.343 (.013) -.405 (.013)
Some College -.252 (..010) -.293 (.010)
Residual from Lost Wage
Adjusted R Squared .3452 .3345
8 Regional and 20 industry dummy variables added in both regressions and not shown.
12 additional dummy variables added in the lost wage equation controlling for year of lost
job and 4 added in the new wage equation controlling for the year of the survey.  Missing
category for education:  college degree of more.  Standard errors in parentheses.24
Table 4: Changes in Wages Caused by Observable Characteristics
All Workers






25 - 50 50 - 75 Highest
Lowest 2,509   789 127  12
25 - 50 738   1,663 907 127
50 - 75 155 802   1,624 855
Highest  35 182 777 2,442
Spearman Rank Order Correlation between Fitted Log(Lost Wage) and Fitted
Log(New Wage): .8317
Workers Who Lost their Jobs Two Years or Less Ago:






25 - 50 50 - 75 Highest
Lowest 1,120   339  51   4
25 - 50 321   755 393  45
50 - 75  60 350   756 348
Highest  13 70 314 1,117
Spearman Rank Order Correlation between Fitted Log(Lost Wage) and Fitted
Log(New Wage):
.847925
Table 4: Changes in Wages Caused by Observable Characteristics (Ctd.)
Workers Who Lost their Jobs Three Years or More Ago:






25 - 50 50 - 75 Highest
Lowest 1,363   460  67 7
25 - 50 414   903 516  64
50 - 75 101 431   881 484
Highest  19 103 433 1,342
Spearman Rank Order Correlation between Fitted Log(Lost Wage) and Fitted
Log(New Wage):
.823926
Table 5:   Pre and Post Displacement Wage Regressions
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Method
Dependent Variable:  Log(Real Weekly Wage)
Lost Wage New Wage
Married .048 (.008) .073 (.008)
African American -.132 (.014) -.125 (.014)
Man .290 (.008) .248 (.008)
Head of Household .019 (.008) .018 (.008)
Age .045 (.003) .038 (.003)
Age Squared -.0005 (.0000) -.0004 (.0000)
Tenure Job Lost .029 (.002) .011 (.002)
Tenure Job Lost Squared -.001 (.000) -.0003 (.0000)
Tenure New Job .033 (.011)
Tenure New Job Squared -.0013 (.0001)
Education:
Elementary -.793 (.039) -.729 (.039)
Junior High -.531 (.022) -.592 (.022)
Some High School -.460 (.016) -.519 (.016)
High School Diploma -.350 (.013) -.395 (.013)
Some College -.257 (..010) -.293 (.010)
Adjusted R Squared .3483 .3368
8 Regional and 20 industry dummy variables added in both regressions and not shown.
12 additional dummy variables added in the lost wage equation controlling for year of lost
job and 4 added in the new wage equation controlling for the year of the survey.  Missing
category for education:  college degree of more.  Standard errors in parentheses.
Spearman Rank Order Correlation between Fitted Log(Lost Wage) and Fitted
Log(New Wage):
.853127
Figure 1: Distribution of Wages
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